By combining a theory of herding behavior with the phenomenon of availability heuristic, this paper shows that non-informative advertisements can affect people's choices by influencing their perception of product quality. We present a model in which people can learn about product quality by observing the choices of others. Consumers are, however, not able to fully distinguish between the observations of real people and fictitious characters in advertisements. Even if a person is aware of this limitation and updates his beliefs accordingly, it is still rational for him to choose the product he has observed most often. In equilibrium the most observed product is always most likely to be of the highest quality. The analysis has important policy implications.
Introduction
It is striking how a vast majority of advertisements can be characterized as noninformative in the sense that they simply show happy people using a certain product but give no useful information about the product's attributes. These non-informative advertisements do, however, have one thing in common -they make the viewer familiar with the brand of the product by repetition of the brand name. How can this type of advertising affect people's behavior? By combining a theory of herding behavior with the phenomenon of availability heuristic, this paper shows that noninformative advertisements can affect people's choices by in uencing their perception of product quality. The non-informative advertisements induce people to believe that the advertised product is of higher quality by making them more familiar with the product.
Often when people choose between different brands of a product, they do not know which brand is of the highest quality. In these situations, people may adopt the product that they observe most others have adopted. Such behavior can be rational if the choices of others yield information about product quality. This phenomenon, referred to as herding behavior, is elegantly captured in several economic models (Banerjee 1992 , Bikhchandani et al. 1992 , and Samuelson 2004) . Moreover, it has been detected in experimental studies (Anderson and Holt 1997) and empirical investigations (see survey by Bikhchandani et al. 1998 ). Tversky and Kahneman (1973) propose that people infer the prevalence of an event "from the ease with which the event can be recalled or imagined". That is, a person who feels that one product seems more familiar than the other, infers that he must have seen the familiar product more often. This phenomenon is called the availability heuristic and has been supported by several experimental studies (see Schwarz and Va u g h n 2002) and empirical investigations (Schrum 1999) . The availability heuristic suggests that people are not able to fully distinguish between observations of real people and ctitious characters in advertisements. A person presented with a choice between two products may feel that one is more familiar than the other. He is, however, not able to fully detect whether this is due to exposure to advertisements. Thus, combining the phenomenon of availability heuristic with a theory of herding behavior suggests that rms can in uence people's perceptions of product quality by making them more familiar with their products. This can be done by exposing people to images of others using their products in advertisements.
Based upon the phenomena of herding behavior and availability heuristic, we present a model in which people learn about product quality by observing the choices of others but are not able to fully distinguish between observations of real people and ctitious characters in advertisements. People are, however, fully aware of this limitation, and update their beliefs accordingly. The analysis shows that even if a person knows that his observations of others may be distorted by observations of ctitious characters in advertisements, it is still rational for this person to choose the product that he has observed most often. In equilibrium this product is always most likely to be of the highest quality. This is because if advertising biased observations to the extent that it would no longer be optimal to act in accordance with observations, then rms would no longer have incentives to advertise.
Legislators have long been concerned about regulating advertising because they are worried that advertising can bias important consumer choices 1 . In order to evaluate the impact of legislators' effort to regulate advertising, it is important to understand how advertising affects people's choices. Interestingly, our model of advertising as distortion of social learning suggests that the degree to which advertising bias consumers' decisions is limited for two reasons: Firstly, rms engage in an advertising "arms race". A r m ' sincentive to advertise is increasing in his competitor's level of advertising. Thus, in a Nash equilibrium the behavioral effect of a r m ' sadvertising effort will partly be cancelled out by his competitor's advertising effort. Secondly, extensive advertising by a low quality producer, can undermine the effect of advertising. In particular, if advertising biases observations to the extent that it is no longer optimal to act in accordance with observations, then consumer would no longer be affected by advertising and rms would no longer have incentives to advertise.
The model of advertising as a distortion of social learning is similar to what social psychologists refer to as the social proof principle of advertising (See Cialdini 1993). The social proof principle recognizes herding behavior as an important behavioral phenomenon. Moreover, it stresses how rms can pro t from using advertisements to manipulate this learning process. In his well recognized book In uence, Cialdini (1993, p 116) writes: "Usually, when a lot of people are doing something, it is the right thing to do [...] it provides a convenient shortcut for determining how to behave but, at the same time, makes one who uses the shortcut vulnerable to the attacks of pro teers who lie in wait along its path." One of the attacks to which Cialdini refers is indeed the large number of non-informative television advertisements that make people familiar with a product by showing "ordinary" people using the product while constantly repeating the brand name.
So far economic theories of advertising have not captured the social proof prin-ciple 2 . Most current theories 3 do not explain how non-informative television adver-tisements simply showing a product being used by "ordinary" people affect people's behavior. Indeed, in the well known signaling models of advertising (see Nelson 1974 , Kihlstrom and Riordan 1984 , and Milgrom and Roberts 1986 , the effect of advertising is entirely independent of the content of the advertisements. In these models, an advertisement by Coke may just as well give a favorable presentation of Pepsi, as long as the audience is convinced that Coke and not Pepsi pays the bill 4 . This is in contrast to the marketing literature in which it is taken as a given that the content of an advertisement and advertisement design affect product perceptions (see e.g. Moorthy and Hawkins, 2005) . In the present model of advertising as a distortion of social learning, the effectiveness of an advertisement is crucially de-pendent on its content. An effective advertisement makes people familiar with the product being advertised. They may then later infer that this product must be of high quality. An important and complementary explanation of non-informative advertisements is Chwe (2001) who view advertisements as a coordination devise in coordi-nation games. Buying a particular good might be a coordination problem either for social of technological reasons. For example, an individual would like to watch the same movie others are watching in order to talk about the movie with his friends and colleagues. Moreover, a fax machine is only useful if other people have fax machines. Chwe argues that advertising can be understood as a common knowl-edge generator in such coordination games. Coordination requires that everybody watches the same ad, that everybody knows that everybody else watches the same ad, and that everybody knows that everybody knows. . -the add has to be common knowledge. Chwe mentions ads on National Television or adds during the Super Bowl as particularly ef cient as common knowledge generators. Notably, Chwe emphasizes that his theory of theory of advertising is limited to coordination games, and cannot explain the role of advertising in other market situations. In particular, it cannot explain the role of advertising in a market with multiple products of different quality and no coordination problems. Moreover, Chwe's theory of advertising cannot explain all the ads that do not generate common knowledge.
In the following, we start out in section two by presenting a simple model of herding behavior. Section three introduces the phenomenon of availability heuristic. By combining a theory of herding behavior with the phenomenon of availability 2 See Bagwell (2003) for an excellent survey of economics of advertising. 3 One important exception is Chwe (2001). 4 Note also that since advertising expenditures are not observable, burning money on advertising is a highly imperfect signal. It would be better to make the amount of "burned money" common knowledge by for example giving the money to a humanitarian organization.
3 heuristic, section four shows how rms can in uence people's choices by making them more familiar with their products through advertising. Section ve analyzes the effect an advertising tax has on product quality. Finally, section six concludes the analysis and discusses some important policy implications.
A Simple Model of Herding Behavior
Two rms H and L are both introducing a new product to the market. The products of the two rms are similar, but they may differ in quality. Each rm i 2 fH;Lg decides the quality of their product q i . Firm L has higher marginal costs of increasing product quality than rm H. Let rm i's cost of increasing product quality be given by c(q i ;i), where c 0 (q i ;i) is unbounded 5 , c 0 (q;L) > c 0 (q;H) and c 00 (q;i) > 0 for all q. Clearly we expect rm H to be the high quality producer and rm L to be the low quality producer in equilibrium, and we will prove this below. Hence the notation H and L.
The rms sell their new product in two periods 6 . In each period, a large number of people purchase a product from either rm H or from rm L: There are no repeat purchases (i.e. the consumers in period one are different from those in period two). The consumers cannot observe product quality. It is well known from previous economic analysis that prices may serve as a perfect signal of product quality 7 . However, pooling equilibria or mixed equilibria, in which prices convey imperfect information about product quality, seem to be equally plausible 8 . We are interested in analyzing how advertising affects consumers' decision when prices do not perfectly signal quality. To simplify, we thus assume that prices carry no information about quality. Moreover, both rms are selling at the same exogenously given price p.
The timing is as follows: First, each rm decides its product quality. Then, consumers in period 1 decide which product to buy. Thereafter, consumers in period 2 observe the choice of one random individual among the consumers in period 1 and then decide which product to buy. Let this observation be denoted by o 2 fH;Lg.
A share λ of the consumers in each period are informed. These consumers receive information about which product is of the highest quality. A share 1 λ of the consumers in each period are uninformed and do not receive any direct information about product quality. The uninformed consumers in period 2, however, can use their observation o to draw some inferences about the relative quality of the products.
Let d = jq H q L j denote the quality differential between the two products. Assume that the greater the quality differential between the two products, the larger the share of informed people. Thus, the share of informed people is a function of the quality differential,
This assumption re ects that the larger the quality differential, the easier it is to distinguish which of two products is of highest quality.
Consumer Decision
The consumers in each period have to decide whether to buy the product of rm H or of rm L. Let s t denote the share of consumers buying the product of highest quality in period t. In the rst period, the informed share of consumers, λ, buy the highest quality product, whereas the uninformed share of consumers, 1 λ; who have no way to distinguish between the two products, choose randomly. Thus,
In period 2, letŵ denote a person's belief that product o is of highest quality, i.e. if a person observes o, then he believes that product o is of highest quality with probabilityŵ: Thus, ifŵ > 1 2 ; a person's optimal strategy is to mimic his observation o, while ifŵ < 1 2 ; the optimal strategy is to choose the opposite product. Assume that consumer know that some consumers are informed (i.e. λ > 0). Then, equation (1) implies that uninformed consumers in period 2 know that a share s 1 > 1 2 chooses the high quality product in period 1. Moreover, if the consumers' prior beliefs, that a r mi is of high quality, are Pr(i = H) = 0:5 for both rms (uninformative priors), then Bayesian updating imply that 9ŵ = s 1 . Thus, since s 1 > 1 2 ; an uninformed consumer in period 2 will always choose in accordance with his observation, o. Hence, in a large population
Firm Decision
Assume that there is a unit mass of consumers. Given the behavior of the consumers, the game between the rms is then de ned by the payoff function
The rms have to decide what quality to produce. It follows from equations (1) - (3) that both rms' marginal bene t of increasing product quality is given by
where
The rst term in (4) re ects a direct bene t of increasing product quality, whereas the second term re ects an indirect bene t of increasing product quality. For the high quality rm, the direct bene t is increased sales in both periods due to a larger share of informed people. The indirect bene t is increased sales in period 2 due to a larger share of the uninformed people learning (correctly) that this rm's product is the highest quality product. For the low quality producer, the direct bene t is increased sales in both periods due to a smaller share of informed people. The indirect bene t is increased sales in period 2 due to a larger share of the uninformed people learning (incorrectly) that this rm's product is the highest quality product. Equation (3) and (4) imply that the rst order conditions for rm H and rm L's pro t maximization problem are given by
This condition implies, as expected, that rm H is the high quality producer. The second order conditions for both rms are ful lled if
Thus, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Assume that (6) holds. Then, there exists a Nash Equilibrium in which rm H produces quality q H and rm L produces quality q L < q H , where q H and q L are determined by equation (5).
Ava i l a b i l i t y Heuristic
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) suggest that people infer the prevalence of an event "from the ease with which the event can be recalled or imagined." That is, if it is easier for a person to imagine H than to imagine L, then the person infers that H happens more frequently than L. This phenomenon, called availability heuristic, has been detected in several experimental studies (see Schwarz and Va u g h n 2002). Moreover, Schrum (1999) argues that the availability heuristic can explain several empirical studies linking television watching to greater perceptions of the prevalence of violent crime, prostitution, alcoholism, drug abuse, divorce, heroic doctors, and private swimming pools. Schrum argues that frequent television watching increases the ease with which a person can imagine these types of events and thus makes him or her overestimate the prevalence of these events.
The availability heuristic suggests that people are not able to fully distinguish between different sources of information. Based on this theory, we will in the following assume that consumers confuse observations of real people and ctitious characters in advertisements. A person presented a choice between H and L may feel that H is more familiar than L. He is, however, not able to fully detect whether this is due to his exposure to advertisements.
The assumption that people confuse real people and ctitious characters in advertisements is in line with important ndings in cognitive psychology indicating clear functional differences between familiarity and recollection (see Kelley and Jacoby (2000) for a survey of this literature). When a person sees something that is familiar, he can often not recollect the source of that familiarity. This distinction between familiarity and recollection can be illustrated by the common experience of recognizing a person as familiar but not being able to recollect who the person is or where they were previously encountered (Yonealis 2002). Interestingly, the distinction between these two types of memory has been discussed since the time of Aristotle, although the development of formal dual-process models by cognitive psychologists and experimental testing only began in the 1970s (Yonealis 2002).
Note that the following is a model of imperfect information with fully rational agents. The analysis shows that even if a person knows that his observations of others may be distorted by observations of ctitious characters in advertisements and updates his beliefs accordingly, it is still rational for this person to choose the product that he has observed most often. In equilibrium this product is always most likely to be of the highest quality. Thus, advertising is distorting the social learning process described in Section 2, but it does not undermine this process.
Advertising as a Distortion of Social Learning
Assume now that rms can expose people to images of others using their product in advertisements. As in the herding model, a consumer in period 2 observes the product choice of one other person. Now, however, this person can either be a ctitious character in an advertisement or a real person from period 1. Let this observation be denoted by o 2 fH;Lg. Consumers are unable to distinguish between observations of real people and ctitious characters in advertisements but know this and update their beliefs accordingly. 10 Let z i denote how much rm i 2 fH;Lg spends on advertising. Consumers cannot observe rms' advertising expenditures. The likelihood of observing the product choice of somebody in an advertisement is dependent on how much the two rms spend on advertising. Assume that the probability of observing somebody in an advertisement is
where η 1. Note that this functional form re ects decreasing marginal returns to advertising. Moreover, there is a limit, η; to how much advertising consumers can absorb. If a person observes the product choice of somebody in an advertisement, then he observes rm i's product with probability
. Thus, the probability that an individual in period 2 observes rm i's product in an advertisement is
The timing is as follows: First, each rm i decides its product quality, q i ; and advertising expenditures, z i . Then, consumers in period 1 decide which product to buy. Thereafter, consumers in period 2 will observe the product choice, o, of either a c t i t i o u scharacter in an advertisement or a real person from period 1. Finally, consumers in period 2 decide which product to buy.
Consumer Decision
The consumers in each period have to decide whether to consume the product of rm H or rm L. As in the situation with no advertising presented in Section 2, the share of consumers buying the product of highest quality in period 1, s 1 , is given by
The probability that a person in period 2 observes H is then given by
Again, letŵ denote a person's belief that product o is of highest quality, i.e if a person observes o, then he believes that product o is of highest quality with probabilityŵ: Thus, ifŵ > 1 2 ; a person's optimal strategy is to mimic his observation o, while ifŵ < 1 2 ; the optimal strategy is to choose the opposite product. Recall that consumers are unable to distinguish between real people and ctitious characters. Thus, uninformative priors and Bayesian updating imply, as in section 2.1, thatŵ = w. If consumers expectations are consistent with the rms' equilibrium strategy, we must have 11 w 1 2 . To see this, assume that w =ŵ < 1 2 in equilibrium. Then, consumers will not choose a product in accordance with their observation, and thus rms will not advertise. This leads to a contradiction, because if rms do not advertise, then we know from section 2 that w = s 1 > 1 2 . Since w 1 2 a consumer will always choose product in accordance with his observation. Thus, in a large population
Firm Decision
The rms have to decide which quality to produce and how much to spend on advertising. Given the behavior of the consumers, the rms' pro ts are now given by
where τ is taxes on advertising. It follows from equation (9) - (12) that both rms' marginal bene t of increasing quality is given by
where λ = λ (d) and d = jq H q L j. Firms still face a direct bene t and an indirect bene t of increasing quality of production. By comparing equation (13) to equation (4) we can, however, see that rms' possibilities to advertise decrease the indirect bene t of increasing product quality. This is because a smaller share of the uninformed people in period 2 are now learning by observing real people from period 11 Below we demonstrate that the condition w 1. Equations (12) and (13) imply that the rst order conditions for rm H and rm L's pro t maximization problems with respect to product quality are given by
Equations (7) - (12) imply that the rms' marginal bene t of increasing advertising are respectively given by
Note that since the marginal cost of advertising is 1+τ, optimal advertising is zero if MB < 1 + τ for z i = 0. Henceforth, we will focus on the interior solution. Thus, the rst order conditions for rm H and rm L's pro t maximization problems with respect to advertising imply that
The equations in (16) imply that in equilibrium we must have z L > z H (i.e. the low quality producer spends more on advertising than the high quality producer). Note that an interior solution (i.e. z H , z L > 0) gives the following parameter restriction
Equations (7) - (10) and (16) imply
Thus, consumers' beliefs are correct. The second order conditions for both rms are ful lled if
Hence, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume that (19) holds and that p > 2(1+λ)(1+τ) η(1 λ) . Then, there exists a Nash Equilibrium in which rm H produces quality q H and rm L produces quality q L < q H . Moreover, rm H spends z H on advertising, and rm L spends z L > z H > 0 on advertising. The levels of advertising, z L and z H , and product quality, q H and q L ; are determined by (14) and (16) .
Existence of the equilibrium of Proposition 2 follows from the fact that (14) and (16) de ne continuous best response functions, and that our assumptions ensures that the optimal solution (q H ;q L ;z H ;z L ) must be contained in a compact set.
The requirement for an inner solution, (17) , implies that 1 4
Recall that λ is strictly increasing in the quality differential between the two products 12 . Thus, equations (16) and (20) imply that the smaller the quality differential between the two products, the larger each rm's advertising expenditure (z H and z L ). This result should not be surprising. It follows from the fact that the smaller the quality differential, the larger the share of uninformed consumers who can be affected by advertising. Note that a consumer is aware that his observation may be of a ctitiouscharacter in an advertisement or of a real person. It is, however, still rational for the consumer to act in accordance with his observation, because the product he observes (i.e. the product which is easiest to imagine) is most likely to be of the highest quality. This is because if advertising biased observations to the extent that it would no longer be optimal to act in accordance with observations, then rms would no longer have incentives to advertise.
Also note that in equilibrium, the low quality producer spends more on advertising than the high quality producer. This is because the low quality producer has the lowest market share in period 1. Thus, an uninformed person in period 2, who observes a real person from period 1, is more likely to observe product H than L. Hence, rm L has a stronger incentive to advertise. This is similar to Bisin and Ve r d i e r (2002) in which parents invest more in educating their children if few people in society behave in the way the parents want their children to behave.
The negative relationship between a r m ' sadvertising and product quality is in line with empirical investigations. Studies of the optometry industry by Kwoka (1984) nd a negative correlation between the quality of eye examination 13 offered by a r m ,and the extent to which the rm is advertising. These results are later backed by Parker (1995) . Moreover, Horstman and Moorthy (2005) show that in New Yo r k , high quality restaurants advertise less than medium quality restaurants.
There are also several empirical studies suggesting a positive relationship between a rms'quality and advertising. These empirical studies are, however, associated with advertising that contains direct information as to product quality (Bagwell 2007) . Based upon these studies, Bagwell (2007) argues that the positive relationship seems to re ect the differential bene t that rms with high quality products enjoy from providing direct product-quality information through their advertisements. Clearly, this type of direct quality-information advertising is different from the non-informative type of advertising analyzed in the present paper.
It is worth noting that the negative relationship between a r m ' sadvertising and product quality does run contrary to the implication of the signaling model of Milgrom and Robert (1986) , where advertising expenditure is a signal of product quality. Their model extends Nelson's (1974) argument that high quality producers have the strongest incentive to achieve an initial sale through advertising due to repeat purchases. Note that in our model there is no repeat purchases. Hence, our result does not directly contradict Milgrom and Roberts claim, rather we consider a different class of products.
Advertising and Product Quality
In this section we will investigate the effect of a tax on advertising on product quality. We will see that if the majority of the people in society are informed, then a tax on advertising will decrease both rms' product quality. However, if the majority of the people in society are uninformed, then a tax on advertising will increase the product quality of both rms.
Equations (7), (8) and (16) imply that in equilibrium
Substituting for y H and x in equation (13) yields
Differentiation with respect to τ implies
Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If the majority of the people in society are informed, then an increase in tax on advertising will decrease both rms' product quality. If the majority of the people in society are uninformed, then an increase in tax on advertising will increase both rms' product quality
Recall that both rms are facing both a direct bene t and an indirect bene t of increasing product quality. For rm H; the direct bene t is increased sales due to a larger share of informed people, and the indirect bene t is increased sales due to a larger share of the uninformed people learning (correctly) that H is the highest quality product. A tax increase will reduce both rms' advertising expenditures, and thus decrease the extent to which advertising distorts social learning. This implies that a tax increase will reduce rm H's direct bene t, whereas it will increase rm H's indirect bene t of increasing product quality. The direct bene t decreases because, as social learning is less distorted, uninformed people are more likely to choose the high quality product. This makes it less important for rm H to increase the share of informed consumers. The indirect bene t increases because, as social learning is less distorted, the share of high quality consumers in period 1 has a stronger effect on the share of uninformed consumers in period 2 choosing the high quality product. This makes it more important for rm H to increase the share of informed consumers.
For rm L; the direct bene t of increasing product quality is increased sales due to a larger share of uninformed people, and the indirect bene t is increased sales due to a larger share of the uninformed people learning (incorrectly) that L is the highest quality product. Similar to rm H, a tax increase will decrease the direct bene t, whereas it will decrease the indirect bene t. For both rms H and L, when the majority of consumers are informed, the decrease in the direct bene t dominates the increase in the indirect bene t. Hence, when the majority of the consumers are informed, a tax increase will decrease the product quality of both rms. This is because advertising reinforces rms' competition on product quality. by personally visiting or calling physicians) and $2.5 billion on direct-to-consumer advertising 15 . Legislators and consumer interest groups are worried that this extensive promotion of prescription drugs can bias physicians' decisions. Moreover, they are worried that the enormous expenditures on promotions will decrease pharmaceutical investments in research and development that can improve product quality.
In order to evaluate the impact of legislators' effort to regulate advertising it is important to understand how advertising affect peoples' choices. In this paper we develop a new theory of advertising. On the background of the phenomena of herding behavior and availability heuristic we present a model in which people learn about product quality by observing the choices of others, but are not able to fully distinguish between observations of real people and ctitious characters in advertisements. People are, however, fully aware of this limitation, and update their beliefs accordingly. The analysis shows that even if a person knows that his observations of others may be distorted by observations of ctitious characters in advertisements, it is still rational for this person to choose the product that he has observed most often.
Our model of advertising as a distortion of social learning suggests that legislators should be less concerned about advertising biasing consumers decision. Interestingly, the model suggests that the degree to which advertising bias consumers' decisions is limited for two reasons: Firstly, rms engage in an advertising "arms race". A rm' sincentive to advertise is increasing in his competitor's level of advertising. Thus, in a Nash equilibrium the behavioral effect of a rm' sadvertising effort will partly be cancelled out by his competitor's advertising effort. Secondly, extensive advertising by a low quality producer, can undermine the effect of advertising. In particular, if advertising biases observations to the extent that it is no longer optimal to act in accordance with observations, then consumer would no longer be affected by advertising and rms would no longer have incentives to advertise. Importantly, our model also suggest that regulating advertising can have unintended effects on product quality. The effect of advertising depends on how well informed consumers are about product quality. Indeed, in markers where most consumers are well informed about product quality, regulating advertising will decrease rms' investments in product quality. This is because advertising is intensifying rms' competition on product quality.
